Using Deep Learning to Solve Computer Security Challenges: A Survey by Choi, Yoon-Ho et al.
Using Deep Learning to Solve Computer Security
Challenges: A Survey∗
Yoon-Ho Choi2,1, Peng Liu1, Zitong Shang1, Haizhou Wang1, Zhilong Wang1,
Lan Zhang1, Junwei Zhou†3,1, and Qingtian Zou1
1The Pennsylvania State University, United States
2Pusan National University, Republic of Korea
3Wuhan University of Technology, China
Abstract
Although using machine learning techniques to solve computer security challenges is
not a new idea, the rapidly emerging Deep Learning technology has recently triggered
a substantial amount of interests in the computer security community. This paper seeks
to provide a dedicated review of the very recent research works on using Deep Learning
techniques to solve computer security challenges. In particular, the review covers eight
computer security problems being solved by applications of Deep Learning: security-
oriented program analysis, defending return-oriented programming (ROP) attacks, achiev-
ing control-flow integrity (CFI), defending network attacks, malware classification, system-
event-based anomaly detection, memory forensics, and fuzzing for software security.
1 Introduction
Using machine learning techniques to solve computer security challenges is not a new idea.
For example, in the year of 1998, Ghosh and others in [1] proposed to train a (traditional)
neural network to do anomaly detection (i.e., detecting anomalous and unknown intrusions
against programs); in the year of 2003, Hu and others in [2] and Heller and others in [3] applied
Support Vector Machines to do anomaly detection (e.g., detecting anomalous Windows registry
accesses).
The machine-learning-based computer security research investigations during 1990-2010,
however, have not been very impactful. For example, to the best of our knowledge, none of the
machine learning applications proposed in [1–3] has been incorporated into a widely deployed
intrusion-detection commercial product.
Regarding why not very impactful, although researchers in the computer security commu-
nity seem to have different opinions, the following remarks by Sommer and Paxson [4] (in the
context of intrusion detection) have resonated with many researchers:
• Remark A: “It is crucial to have a clear picture of what problem a system targets: what
specifically are the attacks to be detected? The more narrowly one can define the target
activity, the better one can tailor a detector to its specifics and reduce the potential for
misclassifications.” [4]
∗The authors of this paper are listed in alphabetic order.
†Corresponding author: junweizhou@msn.com
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• Remark B: “If one cannot make a solid argument for the relation of the features to the
attacks of interest, the resulting study risks foundering on serious flaws.” [4]
These insightful remarks, though well aligned with the machine learning techniques used
by security researchers during 1990-2010, may become a less significant concern with Deep
Learning (DL), a rapidly emerging machine learning technology. Of course, it should be no-
ticed that these remarks were raised before researchers started using DL to solve computer
security challenges.
As stated in [5], “DL is a statistical technique that exploits large quantities of data as training
sets for a network with multiple hidden layers, called a deep neural network (DNN). A DNN
is trained on a dataset, generating outputs, calculating errors, and adjusting its internal param-
eters. Then the process is repeated hundreds of thousands of times until the network achieves
an acceptable level of performance. It has proved to be an effective technique for image classi-
fication, object detection, speech recognition, and natural language processing––problems that
challenged researchers for decades. By learning from data, DNNs can solve some problems
much more effectively, and also solve problems that were never solvable before.”
Now let’s take a high-level look at how DL could make it substantially easier to overcome
the challenges identified by Sommer and Paxson [4]. First, one major advantage of DL is
that it makes learning algorithms less dependent on feature engineering. This characteristic of
DL makes it easier to overcome the challenge indicated by Remark B. Second, another major
advantage of DL is that it could achieve high classification accuracy with minimum domain
knowledge. This characteristic of DL makes it easier to overcome the challenge indicated by
Remark A.
Key observation. The above discussion indicates that DL could be a game changer in
applying machine learning techniques to solving computer security challenges.
Motivated by this observation, this paper seeks to provide a dedicated review of the very re-
cent research works on using Deep Learning techniques to solve computer security challenges.
It should be noticed that since this paper aims to provide a dedicated review, non-deep-learning
techniques and their security applications are out of the scope of this paper.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a four-phase
workflow framework which we use to summarize the existing works in a unified manner. In
Section 3-10, we provide a review of eight computer security problems being solved by appli-
cations of Deep Learning, respectively. In Section 11, we will discuss certain similarity and
certain dissimilarity among the existing works. In Section 12, we mention two further areas of
investigation. In Section 13, we conclude the paper.
2 A four-phase workflow framework can summarize the ex-
isting works in a unified manner
We found that a four-phase workflow framework can provide a unified way to summarize all
the research works surveyed by us. In particular, we found that each work surveyed by us
employs a particular workflow when using machine learning techniques to solve a computer
security challenge, and we found that each workflow consists of two or more phases. By “a
unified way”, we mean that every workflow surveyed by us is essentially an instantiation of a
common workflow pattern which is shown in Figure 1.
2
2.1 Definitions of the four phases
The four phases, shown in Figure 1, are defined as follows. To make the definitions of the four
phases more tangible, we use a running example to illustrate each of the four phases.
Data 
Preprocessing
Representation 
Learning
Classifier
LearningRaw Data
Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV
Definition of four Phases
• Phase I, Raw Data: The raw data.
• Phase II, Data Preprocessing : Convert the raw data into a clean data set, 
whenever the raw data format is not feasible for the analysis.
• Phase III, Representation Learning: As defined in [1] “learning representations 
of the data that make it easier to extract useful information when building 
classifiers or other predictors”.
• Phase IV, Classifier: Classify or predict according to the input data.
[1] Y. Bengio, A. Courville and P. Vincent, "Representation Learning: A Review and New Perspectives," in IEEE Transactions on Pattern 
Analysis and Machine Intelligence, vol. 35, no. 8, pp. 1798-1828, Aug. 2013.
Figure 1: Overview of the four-phase workflow
Phase I.(Obtaining the Raw Data)
In this phase, certain raw data are collected.
Running Example: When Deep Learning is used to detect suspicious events in a Hadoop
distributed file system (HDFS), the raw data are usually the event (e.g., a bl ck is allocated,
read, written, replicated, or deleted) that have happened to each block. Since these events
are recorded in Hadoop logs, the log files hold the raw data. Since each event is uniquely
identified by a particular (block ID, timestamp) tupl , we could simply view the raw data as n
event sequences. Here n is the total number of blocks in the HDFS. For example, the raw data
collected in [6] in total consists of 11,197,954 events. Since 575,139 blocks were in the HDFS,
there were 575,139 event sequences in the raw data, and on average each event sequence had
19 events. One such event sequence is shown as follows:
081110 112428 31 INFO dfs.FSNamesystem: BLOCK* NameSystem.allocateBlock:
/user/root/rand/_temporary/_task_200811101024_0001_m_001649_0/
part-01649.blk_-1033546237298158256
081110 112428 9602 INFO dfs.DataNode$DataXceiver:
Receiving block blk_-1033546237298158256 src: /10.250.13.240:54015
dest:/10.250.13.240:50010
081110 112428 9982 INFO dfs.DataNode$DataXceiver:
Receiving block blk_-1033546237298158256 src: /10.250.13.240:52837
dest:/10.250.13.240:50010
081110 112432 9982 INFO dfs.DataNode$DataXceiver:
writeBlock blk_-1033546237298158256 received exception
java.io.IOException:Could not read from stream
Phase II.(Data Preprocessing)
Both Phase II and Phase III aim to properly extract and represent the useful information held
in the raw data collected in Phase I. Both Phase II and Phase III are closely related to feature
engineering. A key difference between Phase II and Phase III is that Phase III is completely
dedicated to representation learning, while Phase II is focused on all the information extraction
and data processing operations that are not based on representation learning.
Running Example: Let’s revisit the aforementioned HDFS. Each recorded event is de-
scribed by unstructured text. In Phase II, the unstructured text is parsed to a data structure
that shows the event type and a list of event variables in (name, value) pairs. Since there are 29
types of events in the HDFS, each event is represented by an integer from 1 to 29 according to
its type. In this way, the aforementioned example event sequence can be transformed to:
3
22, 5, 5, 7
Phase III.(Representation Learning)
As stated in [7], “Learning representations of the data that make it easier to extract useful
information when building classifiers or other predictors.”
Running Example: Let’s revisit the same HDFS. Although DeepLog [8] directly employed
one-hot vectors to represent the event types without representation learning, if we view an event
type as a word in a structured language, one may actually use the word embedding technique
to represent each event type. It should be noticed that the word embedding technique is a
representation learning technique.
Phase IV.(Classifier Learning)
This phase aims to build specific classifiers or other predictors through Deep Learning.
Running Example: Let’s revisit the same HDFS. DeepLog [8] used Deep Learning to build
a stacked LSTM neural network for anomaly detection. For example, let’s consider event
sequence {22,5,5,5,11,9,11,9,11,9,26,26,26} in which each integer represents the event type of
the corresponding event in the event sequence. Given a window size h = 4, the input sample and
the output label pairs to train DeepLog will be: {22,5,5,5→ 11 }, {5,5,5,11→ 9 }, {5,5,11,9
→ 11 }, and so forth. In the detection stage, DeepLog examines each individual event. It
determines if an event is treated as normal or abnormal according to whether the event’s type
is predicted by the LSTM neural network, given the history of event types. If the event’s type
is among the top g predicted types, the event is treated as normal; otherwise, it is treated as
abnormal.
2.2 Using the four-phase workflow framework to summarize some repre-
sentative research works
In this subsection, we use the four-phase workflow framework to summarize two representa-
tive works for each security problem. The summary is shown in Table 1. There are seven
columns in the table. In the first column, we listed eight security problems, including security-
oriented program analysis, defending return-oriented programming (ROP) attacks, control-flow
integrity (CFI), defending network attacks (NA), malware classification (MC), system-event-
based anomaly detection (SEAD), memory forensics (MF), and fuzzing for software security.
In the second column, we list the very recent two representative works for each security prob-
lem. From the 3rd to 6th columns, we sequentially describe how the four phases are deployed
at each work. In the 6th column, we list the Deep Learning models such as deep neural network
(DNN), recurrent neural network (RNN),long short-term memory (LSTM), and convolutional
neural network (CNN). In the 7th column, we list the evaluation results for each work in terms
of accuracy (ACC), precision (PRC), recall (REC), F1 score (F1), false positive rate (FPR) and
false negative rate (FNR), respectively.
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2.3 Methodology for reviewing the existing works
Data representation (or feature engineering) plays an important role in solving security prob-
lems with Deep Learning. This is because data representation is a way to take advantage of
human ingenuity and prior knowledge to extract and organize the discriminative information
from the data. Many efforts in deploying machine learning algorithms in security domain ac-
tually goes into the design of preprocessing pipelines and data transformations that result in a
representation of the data to support effective machine learning.
In order to expand the scope and ease of applicability of machine learning in security do-
main, it would be highly desirable to find a proper way to represent the data in security domain,
which can entangle and hide more or less the different explanatory factors of variation behind
the data. To let this survey adequately reflect the important role played by data representation,
our review will focus on how the following three questions are answered by the existing works:
• Question 1: Is Phase II pervasively done in the literature? When Phase II is skipped in a
work, are there any particular reasons?
• Question 2: Is Phase III employed in the literature? When Phase III is skipped in a work,
are there any particular reasons?
• Question 3: When solving different security problems, is there any commonality in
terms of the (types of) classifiers learned in Phase IV? Among the works solving the
same security problem, is there dissimilarity in terms of classifiers learned in Phase IV?
Phase III
class 1
no consideration class 4
comparison
class 3no compari
son
adoption
class 2no adoptio
n
conside
ration
Figure 2: Classification tree for different Phase III methods. Here, consideration,
adoption, and comparison indicate that a work considers Phase III, adopts Phase III and
makes comparison with other methods, respectively.
To group the Phase III methods at different applications of Deep Learning in solving the
same security problem, we introduce a classification tree as shown in Figure 2. The classifi-
cation tree categorizes the Phase III methods in our selected survey works into four classes.
First, class 1 includes the Phase III methods which do not consider representation learning.
Second, class 2 includes the Phase III methods which consider representation learning but, do
not adopt it. Third, class 3 includes the Phase III methods which consider and adopt repre-
sentation learning but, do not compare the performance with other methods. Finally, class 4
includes the Phase III methods which consider and adopt representation learning and, compare
the performance with other methods.
In the remaining of this paper, we take a closer look at how each of the eight security
problems is being solved by applications of Deep Learning in the literature.
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3 A closer look at applications of Deep Learning in solving
security-oriented program analysis challenges
3.1 Introduction
Security-oriented program analysis is widely used in software security. For example, symbolic
execution and taint analysis are used to discover, detect and analyze vulnerabilities in programs.
Control flow analysis, data flow analysis and pointer/alias analysis are important components
when enforcing many secure strategies, such as control flow integrity, data flow integrity and
doling dangling pointer elimination. Reverse engineering was used by defenders and attackers
to understand the logic of a program without source code.
In this section, we will review the very recent four representative works that use Deep
Learning for security-oriented program analysis. We observed that they focused on different
goals. Shin, et al. designed a model [9] to identify the function boundary. EKLAVYA [10]
was developed to learn the function type. Gemini [12] was proposed to detect similarity among
functions. DEEPVSA [11] was designed to learn memory region of an indirect addressing from
the code sequence. Among these works, we select two representative works [9, 10] and then,
summarize the analysis results in Table 1 in detail.
Our review will be centered around three questions described in Section 2.3. In the re-
maining of this section, we will first provide a set of observations, and then we provide the
indications. Finally, we provide some general remarks.
3.2 Key findings from a closer look
From a close look at the very recent applications using Deep Learning for solving security-
oriented program analysis challenges, we observed the followings:
• Observation 1: All of the works in our survey used binary files as their raw data.
Phase II in our survey had one similar and straightforward goal – extracting code se-
quences from the binary. Difference among them was that the code sequence was ex-
tracted directly from the binary file when solving problems in static program analysis,
while it was extracted from the program execution when solving problems in dynamic
program analysis.
• Observation 2: Most data representation methods generally took into account the do-
main knowledge.
Most data representation methods generally took into the domain knowledge, i.e., what
kind of information they wanted to reserve when processing their data. Note that the
feature selection has a wide influence on Phase II and Phase III, for example, embedding
granularities, representation learning methods. Gemini [12] selected function level fea-
ture and other works in our survey selected instruction level feature. To be specifically,
all the works except Gemini [12] vectorized code sequence on instruction level.
• Observation 3: To better support data representation for high performance, some works
adopted representation learning.
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For instance, DEEPVSA [11] employed a representation learning method, i.e., bi-directional
LSTM, to learn data dependency within instructions. EKLAVYA [10] adopted represen-
tation learning method, i.e., word2vec technique, to extract inter-instruciton information.
It is worth noting that Gemini [12] adopts the Structure2vec embedding network in its
siamese architecture in Phase IV (see details in Observation 7). The Structure2vec em-
bedding network learned information from an attributed control flow graph.
• Observation 4: According to our taxonomy, most works in our survey were classified
into class 4.
To compare the Phase III, we introduced a classification tree with three layers as shown
in Figure 2 to group different works into four categories. The decision tree grouped our
surveyed works into four classes according to whether they considered representation
learning or not, whether they adopted representation learning or not, and whether they
compared their methods with others’, respectively, when designing their framework. Ac-
cording to our taxonomy, EKLAVYA [10], DEEPVSA [11] were grouped into class 4
shown in Figure 2. Also, Gemini’s work [12] and Shin, et al.’s work [9] belonged to class
1 and class 2 shown in Figure 2, respectively.
• Observation 5: All the works in our survey explain why they adopted or not did not adopt
one of representation learning algorithms.
Two works in our survey adopted representation learning for different reasons: to en-
hance model’s ability of generalization [10]; and to learn the dependency within instruc-
tions [11]. It is worth noting that Shin, et al. did not adopt representation learning
because they wanted to preserve the “attractive” features of neural networks over other
machine learning methods – simplicity. As they stated, “first, neural networks can learn
directly from the original representation with minimal preprocessing (or “feature engi-
neering”) needed.” and “second, neural networks can learn end-to-end, where each of
its constituent stages are trained simultaneously in order to best solve the end goal.”
Although Gemini [12] did not adopt representation learning when processing their raw
data, the Deep Learning models in siamese structure consisted of two graph embedding
networks and one cosine function.
• Observation 6: The analysis results showed that a suitable representation learning method
could improve accuracy of Deep Learning models.
DEEPVSA [11] designed a series of experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of its repre-
sentative method. By combining with the domain knowledge, EKLAVYA [10] employed
t-SNE plots and analogical reasoning to explain the effectiveness of their representation
learning method in an intuitive way.
• Observation 7: Various Phase IV methods were used.
In Phase IV, Gemini [12] adopted siamese architecture model which consisted of two
Structure2vec embedding networks and one cosine function. The siamese architecture
took two functions as its input, and produced the similarity score as the output. The other
three works [9–11] adopted bi-directional RNN, RNN, bi-directional LSTM respectively.
Shin, et al. adopted bi-directional RNN because they wanted to combine both the past
11
and the future information in making a prediction for the present instruction [9]. DEEP-
VSA [11] adopted bi-directional RNN to enable their model to infer memory regions in
both forward and backward ways.
The above observations seem to indicate the following indications:
• Indication 1: Phase III is not always necessary.
Not all authors regard representation learning as a good choice even though some case
experiments show that representation learning can improve the final results. They value
more the simplicity of Deep Learning methods and suppose that the adoption of repre-
sentation learning weakens the simplicity of Deep Learning methods.
• Indication 2: Even though the ultimate objective of Phase III in the four surveyed works
is to train a model with better accuracy, they have different specific motivations as de-
scribed in Observation 5.
When authors choose representation learning, they usually try to convince people the
effectiveness of their choice by empirical or theoretical analysis.
• Indication 3: Observation 7 indicates that authors usually refer to the domain knowledge
when designing the architecture of Deep Learning model.
For instance, the works we reviewed commonly adopt bi-directional RNN when their
prediction partly based on future information in data sequence.
4 A closer look at applications of Deep Learning in defend-
ing ROP attacks
4.1 Introduction
Return-oriented programming (ROP) attack is one of the most dangerous code reuse attacks,
which allows the attackers to launch control-flow hijacking attack without injecting any ma-
licious code. Rather, It leverages particular instruction sequences (called “gadgets”) widely
existing in the program space to achieve Turing-complete attacks [54]. Gadgets are instruction
sequences that end with a RET instruction. Therefore, they can be chained together by spec-
ifying the return addresses on program stack. Many traditional techniques could be used to
detect ROP attacks, such as control-flow integrity (CFI [55]), but many of them either have low
detection rate or have high runtime overhead. Here, authors explore data-driven techniques to
detect ROP attack, specifically methods using neural networks.
In this section, we will review the very recent three representative works that use Deep
Learning for defending ROP attacks: ROPNN [14], HeNet [15] and DeepCheck [16]. We
observed that none of the works considered Phase III, so all of them belong to class 1 according
to our taxonomy as shown in Figure 2. The analysis results of ROPNN [14] and HeNet [15] are
shown in Table 1. Also, we observed that three works had different goals. ROPNN [14] aims
to detect ROP attacks. HeNet [15] aims to detect malware using CFI. DeepCheck [16] aims at
detecting all kinds of code reuse attacks.
Our review will be centered around three questions described in Section 2.3. In the re-
maining of this section, we will first provide a set of observations, and then we provide the
indications. Finally, we provide some general remarks.
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4.2 Key findings from a closer look
From a close look at the very recent applications using Deep Learning for defending return-
oriented programming attacks, we observed the followings:
• Observation 1: All the works [14–16] in this survey focused on data generation and
acquisition.
In ROPNN [14], both malicious samples (gadget chains) were generated using an auto-
mated gadget generator (i.e. ROPGadget [56]) and a CPU emulator (i.e. Unicorn [57]).
ROPGadget was used to extract instruction sequences that could be used as gadgets from
a program, and Unicorn was used to validate the instruction sequences. Correspond-
ing benign sample (gadget-chain-like instruction sequences) were generated by disas-
sembling a set of programs. In DeepCheck [16] refers to the key idea of control-flow
integrity [55]. It generates program’s run-time control flow through new feature of In-
tel CPU (Intel Processor Tracing), then compares the run-time control flow with the
program’s control-flow graph (CFG) that generates through static analysis. Benign in-
struction sequences are that with in the program’s CFG, and vice versa. In HeNet [15],
program’s execution trace was extracted using the similar way as DeepCheck. Then,
each byte was transformed into a pixel with an intensity between 0-255. Known malware
samples and benign software samples were used to generate malicious data benign data,
respectively.
• Observation 2: None of the ROP works in this survey deployed Phase III.
Both ROPNN [14] and DeepCheck [16] used binary instruction sequences for training.
In ROPNN [14], one byte was used as the very basic element for data pre-processing.
Bytes were formed into one-hot matrices and flattened for 1-dimensional convolutional
layer. In DeepCheck [16], half-byte was used as the basic unit. Each half-byte (4 bits)
was transformed to decimal form ranging from 0-15 as the basic element of the input
vector, then was fed into a fully-connected input layer. On the other hand, HeNet [15]
used different kinds of data. By the time this survey has been drafted, the source code of
HeNet was not available to public and thus, the details of the data pre-processing was not
be investigated. However, it is still clear that HeNet used binary branch information col-
lected from Intel PT rather than binary instructions. In HeNet, each byte was converted
to one decimal number ranging from 0 to 255. Byte sequences was sliced and formed
into image sequences (each pixel represented one byte) for a fully-connected input layer.
• Observation 3: Fully-connected neural network was widely used.
Only ROPNN [14] used 1-dimensional convolutional neural network (CNN) when ex-
tracting features. Both HeNet [15] and DeepCheck [16] used fully-connected neural
network (FCN). None of the works used recurrent neural network (RNN) and the vari-
ants.
The above observations seem to indicate the following indications:
• Indication 1: It seems like that one of the most important factors in ROP problem is
feature selection and data generation.
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All three works use very different methods to collect/generate data, and all the authors
provide very strong evidences and/or arguments to justify their approaches. ROPNN [14]
was trained by the malicious and benign instruction sequences. However, there is no
clear boundary between benign instruction sequences and malicious gadget chains. This
weakness may impair the performance when applying ROPNN to real world ROP attacks.
As oppose to ROPNN, DeepCheck [16] utilizes CFG to generate training basic-block se-
quences. However, since the malicious basic-block sequences are generated by randomly
connecting nodes without edges, it is not guaranteed that all the malicious basic-blocks
are executable. HeNet [15] generates their training data from malware. Technically,
HeNet could be used to detect any binary exploits, but their experiment focuses on ROP
attack and achieves 100% accuracy. This shows that the source of data in ROP problem
does not need to be related to ROP attacks to produce very impressive results.
• Indication 2: Representation learning seems not critical when solve ROP problems using
Deep Learning.
Minimal process on data in binary form seems to be enough to transform the data into
a representation that is suitable for neural networks. Certainly, it is also possible to
represent the binary instructions at a higher level, such as opcodes, or use embedding
learning. However, as stated in [14], it appears that the performance will not change
much by doing so. The only benefit of representing input data to a higher level is to
reduce irrelevant information, but it seems like neural network by itself is good enough
at extracting features.
• Indication 3: Different Neural network architecture does not have much influence on the
effectiveness of defending ROP attacks.
Both HeNet [15] and DeepCheck [16] utilizes standard DNN and achieved comparable
results on ROP problems. One can infer that the input data can be easily processed by
neural networks, and the features can be easily detected after proper pre-process.
It is not surprising that researchers are not very interested in representation learning for
ROP problems as stated in Observation 1. Since ROP attack is focus on the gadget chains, it is
straightforward for the researcher to choose the gadgets as their training data directly. It is easy
to map the data into numerical representation with minimal processing. An example is that
one can map binary executable to hexadecimal ASCII representation, which could be a good
representation for neural network.
Instead, researchers focus more in data acquisition and generation. In ROP problems, the
amount of data is very limited. Unlike malware and logs, ROP payloads normally only con-
tain addresses rather than codes, which do not contain any information without providing the
instructions in corresponding addresses. It is thus meaningless to collect all the payloads. At
the best of our knowledge, all the previous works use pick instruction sequences rather than
payloads as their training data, even though they are hard to collect.
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5 A closer look at applications of Deep Learning in achieving
CFI
5.1 Introduction
The basic ideas of control-flow integrity (CFI) techniques, proposed by Abadi in 2005 [55],
could be dated back to 2002, when Vladimir and his fellow researchers proposed an idea called
program shepherding [58], a method of monitoring the execution flow of a program when it is
running by enforcing some security policies. The goal of CFI is to detect and prevent control-
flow hijacking attacks, by restricting every critical control flow transfers to a set that can only
appear in correct program executions, according to a pre-built CFG. Traditional CFI techniques
typically leverage some knowledge, gained from either dynamic or static analysis of the target
program, combined with some code instrumentation methods, to ensure the program runs on a
correct track.
However, the problems of traditional CFI are: (1) Existing CFI implementations are not
compatible with some of important code features [59]; (2) CFGs generated by static, dynamic
or combined analysis cannot always be precisely completed due to some open problems [60];
(3) There always exist certain level of compromises between accuracy and performance over-
head and other important properties [61, 62]. Recent research has proposed to apply Deep
Learning on detecting control flow violation. Their result shows that, compared with tra-
ditional CFI implementation, the security coverage and scalability were enhanced in such a
fashion [17]. Therefore, we argue that Deep Learning could be another approach which re-
quires more attention from CFI researchers who aim at achieving control-flow integrity more
efficiently and accurately.
In this section, we will review the very recent three representative papers that use Deep
Learning for achieving CFI. Among the three, two representative papers [17, 18] are already
summarized phase-by-phase in Table 1. We refer to interested readers the Table 1 for a concise
overview of those two papers.
Our review will be centered around three questions described in Section 2.3. In the re-
maining of this section, we will first provide a set of observations, and then we provide the
indications. Finally, we provide some general remarks.
5.2 Key findings from a closer look
From a close look at the very recent applications using Deep Learning for achieving control-
flow integrity, we observed the followings:
• Observation 1: None of the related works realize preventive1 prevention of control flow
violation.
After doing a thorough literature search, we observed that security researchers are quite
behind the trend of applying Deep Learning techniques to solve security problems. Only
one paper has been founded by us, using Deep Learning techniques to directly enhance
the performance of CFI [17]. This paper leveraged Deep Learning to detect docu-
ment malware through checking program’s execution traces that generated by hardware.
Specifically, the CFI violations were checked in an offline mode. So far, no works have
realized Just-In-Time checking for program’s control flow.
1We refer readers to [62] which systemizes the knowledge of protections by CFI schemes.
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In order to provide more insightful results, in this section, we try not to narrow down
our focus on CFI detecting attacks at run-time, but to extend our scope to papers that
take good use of control flow related data, combined with Deep Learning techniques
[18, 63]. In one work, researchers used self-constructed instruction-level CFG to detect
program defection [18]. In another work, researchers used lazy-binding CFG to detect
sophisticated malware [63].
• Observation 2: Diverse raw data were used for evaluating CFI solutions.
In all surveyed papers, there are two kinds of control flow related data being used:
program instruction sequences and CFGs. Barnum et al. [17] employed statically and
dynamically generated instruction sequences acquired by program disassembling and
Intel R© Processor Trace. CNNoverCFG [18] used self-designed algorithm to construct
instruction level control-flow graph. Minh Hai Nguyen et al. [63] used proposed lazy-
binding CFG to reflect the behavior of malware DEC.
• Observation 3: All the papers in our survey adopted Phase II.
All the related papers in our survey employed Phase II to process their raw data before
sending them into Phase III. In Barnum [17], the instruction sequences from program run-
time tracing were sliced into basic-blocks. Then, they assigned each basic-blocks with
an unique basic-block ID (BBID). Finally, due to the nature of control-flow hijacking
attack, they selected the sequences ending with indirect branch instruction (e.g., indirect
call/jump, return and so on) as the training data. In CNNoverCFG [18], each of instruc-
tions in CFG were labeled with its attributes in multiple perspectives, such as opcode,
operands, and the function it belongs to. The training data is generated are sequences
generated by traversing the attributed control-flow graph. Nguyen and others [63] con-
verted the lazy-binding CFG to corresponding adjacent matrix and treated the matrix as
a image as their training data.
• Observation 4: All the papers in our survey did not adopt Phase III.
We observed all the papers we surveyed did not adopted Phase III. Instead, they adopted
the form of numerical representation directly as their training data. Specifically, Barnum
[17] grouped the the instructions into basic-blocks, then represented basic-blocks with
uniquely assigning IDs. In CNNoverCFG [18], each of instructions in the CFG was
represented by a vector that associated with its attributes. Nguyen and others directly
used the hashed value of bit string representation.
• Observation 5: Various Phase IV models were used.
Barnum [17] utilized BBID sequence to monitor the execution flow of the target program,
which is sequence-type data. Therefore, they chose LSTM architecture to better learn
the relationship between instructions. While in the other two papers [18,63], they trained
CNN and directed graph-based CNN to extract information from control-flow graph and
image, respectively.
The above observations seem to indicate the following indications:
• Indication 1: All the existing works did not achieve Just-In-Time CFI violation detection.
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It is still a challenge to tightly embed Deep Learning model in program execution. All
existing work adopted lazy-checking – checking the program’s execution trace following
its execution.
• Indication 2: There is no unified opinion on how to generate malicious sample.
Data are hard to collect in control-flow hijacking attacks. The researchers must carefully
craft malicious sample. It is not clear whether the “handcrafted” sample can reflect the
nature the control-flow hijacking attack.
• Indication 3: The choice of methods in Phase II are based on researchers’ security
domain knowledge.
6 A closer look at applications of Deep Learning in defend-
ing network attacks
6.1 Introduction
Network security is becoming more and more important as we depend more and more on net-
works for our daily lives, works and researches. Some common network attack types include
probe, denial of service (DoS), Remote-to-local (R2L), etc. Traditionally, people try to detect
those attacks using signatures, rules, and unsupervised anomaly detection algorithms. How-
ever, signature based methods can be easily fooled by slightly changing the attack payload;
rule based methods need experts to regularly update rules; and unsupervised anomaly detec-
tion algorithms tend to raise lots of false positives. Recently, people are trying to apply Deep
Learning methods for network attack detection.
In this section, we will review the very recent seven representative works that use Deep
Learning for defending network attacks. [19,22,24] build neural networks for multi-class classi-
fication, whose class labels include one benign label and multiple malicious labels for different
attack types. [20] ignores normal network activities and proposes parallel cross convolutional
neural network (PCCN) to classify the type of malicious network activities. [21] applies Deep
Learning to detecting a specific attack type, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. [23,25]
explores both binary classification and multi-class classification for benign and malicious ac-
tivities. Among these seven works, we select two representative works [19,20] and summarize
the main aspects of their approaches regarding whether the four phases exist in their works, and
what exactly do they do in the Phase if it exists. We direct interested readers to Table 1 for a
concise overview of these two works.
Our review will be centered around three questions described in Section 2.3. In the re-
maining of this section, we will first provide a set of observations, and then we provide the
indications. Finally, we provide some general remarks.
6.2 Key findings from a closer look
From a close look at the very recent applications using Deep Learning for solving network
attack challenges, we observed the followings:
• Observation 1: All the seven works in our survey used public datasets, such as UNSW-
NB15 [64] and CICIDS2017 [65].
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The public datasets were all generated in test-bed environments, with unbalanced sim-
ulated benign and attack activities. For attack activities, the dataset providers launched
multiple types of attacks, and the numbers of malicious data for those attack activities
were also unbalanced.
• Observation 2: The public datasets were given into one of two data formats, i.e., PCAP
and CSV.
One was raw PCAP or parsed CSV format, containing network packet level features, and
the other was also CSV format, containing network flow level features, which showed
the statistic information of many network packets. Out of all the seven works, [21, 22]
used packet information as raw inputs, [20, 23–25] used flow information as raw inputs,
and [19] explored both cases.
• Observation 3: In order to parse the raw inputs, preprocessing methods, including one-
hot vectors for categorical texts, normalization on numeric data, and removal of unused
features/data samples, were commonly used.
Commonly removed features include IP addresses and timestamps. [25] also removed
port numbers from used features. By doing this, they claimed that they could “avoid
over-fitting and let the neural network learn characteristics of packets themselves”. One
outlier was that, when using packet level features in one experiment, [19] blindly chose
the first 50 bytes of each network packet without any feature extracting processes and fed
them into neural network.
• Observation 4: Using image representation improved the performance of security solu-
tions using Deep Learning.
After preprocessing the raw data, while [20] transformed the data into image representa-
tion, [21–25] directly used the original vectors as an input data. Also, [19] explored both
cases and reported better performance using image representation.
• Observation 5: None of all the seven surveyed works considered representation learning.
All the seven surveyed works belonged to class 1 shown in Figure 2. They either directly
used the processed vectors to feed into the neural networks, or changed the representation
without explanation. One research work [19] provided a comparison on two different
representations (vectors and images) for the same type of raw input. However, the other
works applied different preprocessing methods in Phase II. That is, since the different
preprocessing methods generated different feature spaces, it was difficult to compare the
experimental results.
• Observation 6: Binary classification model showed better results from most experiments.
Among all the seven surveyed works, [21] focused on one specific attack type and only
did binary classification to classify whether the network traffic was benign or malicious.
Also, [19, 20, 22, 24] included more attack types and did multi-class classification to
classify the type of malicious activities, and [23, 25] explored both cases. As for multi-
class classification, the accuracy for selective classes was good, while accuracy for other
classes, usually classes with much fewer data samples, suffered by up to 20% degrada-
tion.
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• Observation 7: Data representation influenced on choosing a neural network model.
The above observations seem to indicate the following indications:
• Indication 1: All works in our survey adopt a kind of preprocessing methods in Phase II,
because raw data provided in the public datasets are either not ready for neural networks,
or that the quality of data is too low to be directly used as data samples.
Preprocessing methods can help increase the neural network performance by improving
the data samples’ qualities. Furthermore, by reducing the feature space, pre-processing
can also improve the efficiency of neural network training and testing. Thus, Phase II
should not be skipped. If Phase II is skipped, the performance of neural network is
expected to go down considerably.
• Indication 2: Although Phase III is not employed in any of the seven surveyed works,
none of them explains a reason for it. Also, they all do not take representation learning
into consideration.
• Indication 3: Because no work uses representation learning, the effectiveness are not
well-studied.
Out of other factors, it seems that the choice of pre-processing methods has the largest
impact, because it directly affects the data samples fed to the neural network.
• Indication 4: There is no guarantee that CNN also works well on images converted from
network features.
Some works that use image data representation use CNN in Phase IV. Although CNN
has been proven to work well on image classification problem in the recent years, there
is no guarantee that CNN also works well on images converted from network features.
From the observations and indications above, we hereby present two recommendations: (1)
Researchers can try to generate their own datasets for the specific network attack they want
to detect. As stated, the public datasets have highly unbalanced number of data for different
classes. Doubtlessly, such unbalance is the nature of real world network environment, in which
normal activities are the majority, but it is not good for Deep Learning. [22] tries to solve this
problem by oversampling the malicious data, but it is better to start with a balanced data set.
(2) Representation learning should be taken into consideration. Some possible ways to apply
representation learning include: (a) apply word2vec method to packet binaries, and categori-
cal numbers and texts; (b) use K-means as one-hot vector representation instead of randomly
encoding texts. We suggest that any change of data representation may be better justified by
explanations or comparison experiments.
7 A closer look at applications of Deep Learning in malware
classification
7.1 Introduction
The goal of malware classification is to identify malicious behaviors in software with static and
dynamic features like control-flow graph and system API calls. Malware and benign programs
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can be collected from open datasets and online websites. Most research will extract semantic
features from those programs using security domain knowledge. To classify those programs,
features need to be parsed to a reasonable representation for Deep Learning models. The state
of art classification approaches using Deep Learning can achieve high accuracy.
In this section, we will review the very recent twelve representative works that use Deep
Learning for malware classification [26–37]. [26] selects three different kinds of static features
to classify malware. [27–29] also use static features from the PE files to classify programs. [30]
extracts behavioral feature images using RNN to represent the behaviors of original programs.
[31] transforms malicious behaviors using representative learning without neural network. [32]
explores RNN model with the API calls sequences as programs’ features. [33,34] skip Phase II
by directly transforming the binary file to image to classify the file. [35, 36] applies dynamic
features to analyze malicious features. [37] combines static features and dynamic features to
represent programs’ features. Among these works, we select two representative works [26, 36]
and identify four phases in their works shown as Table 1.
Our review will be centered around three questions described in Section 2.3. In the re-
maining of this section, we will first provide a set of observations, and then we provide the
indications. Finally, we provide some general remarks.
7.2 Key findings from a closer look
From a close look at the very recent applications using Deep Learning for solving malware
classification challenges, we observed the followings:
• Observation 1: Features selected in malware classification were grouped into three cat-
egories: static features, dynamic features, and hybrid features.
Typical static features include metadata, PE import Features, Byte/Entorpy, String, and
Assembly Opcode Features derived from the PE files [27–29]. De LaRosa, Kilgallon,
et al. [26] took three kinds of static features: byte-level, basic-level ( strings in the file,
the metadata table, and the import table of the PE header), and assembly features-level.
Some works directly considered binary code as static features [33, 34].
Different from static features, dynamic features were extracted by executing the files to
retrieve their behaviors during execution. The behaviors of programs, including the API
function calls, their parameters, files created or deleted, websites and ports accessed, etc,
were recorded by a sandbox as dynamic features [35]. The process behaviors includ-
ing operation name and their result codes were extracted [30]. The process memory,
tri-grams of system API calls and one corresponding input parameter were chosen as dy-
namic features [31]. An API calls sequence for an APK file was another representation
of dynamic features [32, 36].
Static features and dynamic features were combined as hybrid features [37]. For static
features, Xu and others in [37] used permissions, networks, calls, and providers, etc. For
dynamic features, they used system call sequences.
• Observation 2: In most works, Phase II was inevitable because extracted features needed
to be vertorized for Deep Learning models.
One-hot encoding approach was frequently used to vectorize features [28–30, 32, 36].
Bag-of-words (BoW) and n-gram were also considered to represent features [32]. Some
works brought the concepts of word frequency in NLP to convert the sandbox file to
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fixed-size inputs [35]. Hashing features into a fixed vector was used as an effective
method to represent features [27]. Bytes histogram using the bytes analysis and bytes-
entropy histogram with a sliding window method were considered [26]. In [26], De La
Rosa and others embeded strings by hashing the ASCII strings to a fixed-size feature
vector. For assembly features, they extracted four different levels of granularity: opera-
tion level (instruction-flow-graph), block level (control-flow-graph), function level (call-
graph), and global level (graphs summarized). bigram, trigram and four-gram vectors
and n-gram graph were used for the hybrid features [37].
• Observation 3: Most Phase III methods were classified into class 1.
Following the classification tree shown in Figure 2, most works were classified into class
1 shown in Figure 2 except two works [30, 31], which belonged to class 3 shown in
Figure 2. To reduce the input dimension, Dahl et al. [31] performed feature selection
using mutual information and random projection. Tobiyama et al. generated behavioral
feature images using RNN [30].
• Observation 4: After extracting features, two kinds of neural network architectures, i.e.,
one single neural network and multiple neural networks with a combined loss function,
were used.
Hierarchical structures, like convolutional layers, fully connected layers and classifi-
cation layers, were used to classify programs [27, 29–34]. A deep stack of denoising
autoencoders was also introduced to learn programs’ behaviors [35]. De La Rosa and
others [26] trained three different models with different features to compare which static
features are relevant for the classification model. Some works investigated LSTM models
for sequential features [32, 36].
Two networks with different features as inputs were used for malware classification by
combining their outputs with a dropout layer and an output layer [28]. In [28], one net-
work transformed PE Metadata and import features using feedforward neurons, another
one leveraged convolutional network layers with opcode sequences. Lifan Xu et al. [37]
constructed a few networks and combined them using a two-level multiple kernel learn-
ing algorithm.
The above observations seem to indicate the following indications:
• Indication 1: Except two works transform binary into images [33, 34], most works sur-
veyed need to adapt methods to vectorize extracted features.
The vectorization methods should not only keep syntactic and semantic information in
features, but also consider the definition of the Deep Learning model.
• Indication 2: Limited researches convert their features using representation learning.
Because some works assume the dynamic and static sequences, like API calls and in-
struction, and have similar syntactic and semantic structure as natural language, some
representation learning techniques like word2vec may be useful in malware detection.
In addition, for the control-flow graph, call graph and other graph representations, graph
embedding is a potential method to transform those features.
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Though several researches have been done in malware detection using Deep Learning, it’s
hard to compare their methods and performances because of two uncertainties in their ap-
proaches. First, the Deep Learning model is a black-box, researchers cannot detail which kind
of features the model learned and explain why their model works. Second, feature selection
and representation affect the model’s performance. Because they do not use the same datasets,
researchers cannot prove their approaches – including selected features and Deep Learning
model – are better than others. The reason why few researchers use open datasets is that exist-
ing open malware datasets are out of data and limited. Also, researchers need to crawl benign
programs from app stores, so their raw programs will be diverse.
8 A closer look at applications of Deep Learning in system-
event-based anomaly detection
8.1 Introduction
System logs recorded significant events at various critical points, which can be used to debug
the system’s performance issues and failures. Moreover, log data are available in almost all
computer systems and are a valuable resource for understanding system status. Recently, a
large number of scholars employed Deep Learning techniques [8, 38–42] to detect anomaly
events in the system logs and diagnosis system failures. The raw log data are unstructured
because their formats and semantics can vary significantly. To detect the anomaly event, the
raw log usually was parsed to structure data, then transformed into a representation that fit into
an effective Deep Learning model. Finally, the anomaly event was detected by Deep Learning
based classifier or predictor.
In this section, we will review the very recent six representative works that use Deep Learn-
ing for system-event-based anomaly detection [8, 38–42]. DeepLog [8] utilizes LSTM that
processes the system log as a natural language sequence, which automatically learns log pat-
terns from the normal event, and detects anomalies when log patterns deviate from the trained
model. LogAnom [38] employs Word2vec to extract the semantic and syntax information from
log samples. Moreover, it uses sequential and quantitative features simultaneously. Desh [39]
uses LSTM to predict node failures that occur in super computing systems from HPC logs.
Andy Brown et al. [40] presented RNN language models augmented with attention for anomaly
detection in system logs. LogRobust [41] uses FastText to represent semantic information of
log events, which can identify and handle unstable log events and sequences. Christophe Bert-
ero and others [42] map log word to a high dimensional metric space using Google’s word2vec
algorithm and take it as features to classify. Among these six works, we select two represen-
tative works [8, 38] and summarize the four phases of their approaches. We direct interested
readers to Table 1 for a concise overview of these two works.
Our review will be centered around three questions described in Section 2.3. In the re-
maining of this section, we will first provide a set of observations, and then we provide the
indications. Finally, we provide some general remarks.
8.2 Key findings from a closer look
From a close look at the very recent applications using Deep Learning for solving security-
event-based anomaly detection challenges, we observed the followings:
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• Observation 1: Most works in this survey adopted Phase II when parsing the raw log
data.
We observe that all the works except for [42] adopted Phase II to parse their raw data.
DeepLog [8] parsed the raw log to different log type based on longest common subse-
quences [43]. Desh [39] parsed the raw log to constant message and variable component.
Loganom [38] parsed the raw log to different log templates according to the frequency of
combinations of long words [44]. Andy Brown et al. [40] parsed the raw log into word
and character tokens. LogRobust [41] extracted its log event by abstracting away the
parameters in the message. Christophe Bertero et al. [42] considered logs as regular text
without parsing.
• Observation 2: Most works have considered and adopted Phase III.
Among these six works, only DeepLog represented the parsed data using the one-hot
vector without learning. Moreover, Loganom [38] compared their results with DeepLog.
According to taxonomy as shown in Figure 2, DeepLog belonged to class 1 and Loganom
belonged to class 4, while the other four works belonged to class 3. Four works [38,39,41,
42] used word embedding techniques to represent the log data. Andy Brown et al. [40]
employed attention vectors to represent the log messages. DeepLog [8] employed the
one-hot vector to represent the log type without learning. We have engaged an experiment
replacing the one-hot vector with trained word embeddings.
• Observation 3: Evaluation results were not compared using the same dataset.
DeepLog [8] employed the one-hot vector to represent the log type without learning, that
is to mean they employed Phase II but not Phase III. However, Christophe Bertero et
al. [42] considered logs as regular text without parsing, and they adopted Phase III but
not Phase II. The precision of the two methods was very high, i.e., greater than 95%.
Unfortunately, the evaluation of the two methods used different datasets.
• Observation 4: Most works empolyed LSTM in Phase IV.
Five works including [8, 38–41] employed LSTM in the Phase IV, while Christophe
Bertero et al. [42] compare LSTM model with other classifiers, such as naive Bayes,
neural networks and random forest.
The above observations seem to indicate the following indications:
• Indication 1: Most of the recent works use trained representation to represent parsed
data.
As shown in Table 2, we can find Phase III is very useful, which can improve detection
accuracy.
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Table 2: Comparison between word embedding and one-hot representation.
Method FP 1 FN 2 Precision Recall F1-measure
Word Embedding 3 680 219 96.069% 98.699% 97.366%
One-hot Vector 4 711 705 95.779% 95.813% 95.796%
DeepLog 5 833 619 95% 96% 96%
1FP: number of false positives; 2FN: number of false negatives; 3Word Embedding:
Log keys are embedded by Continuous Bag of words; 4 One-hot Vector: We repro-
duced the results according to DeepLog; 5 DeepLog: Orignial results presented in the
work [8].
Indication 2: Phase II and Phase III cannot be skipped simultaneously.
Both Phase II and Phase III are not required. However, all methods have employed
Phase II or Phase III.
• Indication 3: Observation 2 indicates that the trained word embedding can improve the
anomaly detection accuracy as shown in Table 2.
• Indication 4: Observation 4 indicates that most works adopt LSTM to detect anomaly
event.
We can find that most works adopt LSTM to detect anomaly event, since log data can
be considered as sequence and there can be lags of unknown duration between important
events in a time series. LSTM has feedback connections, which cannot only process
single data points, but also entire sequences of data.
In conclusion, neither Phase II nor Phase III is required in system event-based anomaly
detection. However, Phase II can remove noise in raw data, and Phase III can learn a proper
representation of the data. Both Phase II and Phase III have a positive effect on anomaly
detection accuracy. Since the event log is text data that we cannot been fed into Deep Learning
model directly, Phase II and Phase III can’t be skipped simultaneously.
9 A closer look at applications of Deep Learning in solving
memory forensics challenges
9.1 Introduction
In the field of computer security, memory forensics is security-oriented forensic analysis of a
computer’s memory dump. Memory forensics can be conducted against OS kernels, user-level
applications, as well as mobile devices. Memory forensics outperforms traditional disk-based
forensics because although secrecy attacks can erase their footprints on disk, they would have
to appear in memory [45]. The memory dump can be considered as a sequence of bytes, thus
memory forensics usually needs to extract security semantic information from raw memory
dump to find attack traces. Several challenges exist in memory forensics such as lack of ade-
quate domain knowledge, lack of robustness and low efficiency. Researchers have been using
Deep Learning to address these challenges [45–48].
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In this section, we will review the very recent four representative works that use Deep
Learning for memory forensics [45–48]. DeepMem [45] recognized the kernel objects from
raw memory dumps by generating abstract representations of kernel objects with a graph-based
Deep Learning approach. MDMF [46] detected OS and architecture-independent malware from
memory snapshots with several pre-processing techniques, domain unaware feature selection,
and a suite of machine learning algorithms. MemTri [47] predicts the likelihood of criminal ac-
tivity in a memory image using a Bayesian network, based on evidence data artefacts generated
by several applications. Dai et al. [48] monitor the malware process memory and classify mal-
ware according to memory dumps, by transforming the memory dump into grayscale images
and adopting a multi-layer perception as the classifier.
Among these four works [45–48], two representative works (i.e., [45,46]) are already sum-
marized phase-by-phase in Table 1. We direct interested readers to Table 1 for a concise
overview of these two works.
Our review will be centered around the three questions raised in Section 2.3. In the re-
maining of this section, we will first provide a set of observations, and then we provide the
indications. Finally, we provide some general remarks.
9.2 Key findings from a closer look
From a close look at the very recent applications using Deep Learning for solving memory
forensics challenges, we observed the followings:
• Observation 1: Most methods used their own datasets for performance evaluation, while
none of them used a public dataset.
DeepMem was evaluated on self-generated dataset by the authors, who collected a large
number of diverse memory dumps, and labeled the kernel objects in them using existing
memory forensics tools like Volatility. MDMF employed the MalRec dataset by Geor-
gia Tech to generate malicious snapshots, while it created a dataset of benign memory
snapshots running normal software. MemTri ran several Windows 7 virtual machine in-
stances with self-designed suspect activity scenarios to gather memory images. Dai et al.
built the Procdump program in Cuckoo sandbox to extract malware memory dumps. We
found that each of the four works in our survey generated their own datasets, while none
was evaluated on a public dataset.
• Observation 2: Among the four works [45–48], two works [45, 47] employed Phase II
while the other two works [46, 48] did not employ.
DeepMem [45] devised a graph representation for a sequence of bytes, taking into ac-
count both adjacency and points-to relations, to better model the contextual information
in memory dumps. MemTri [47] firstly identified the running processes within the mem-
ory image that match the target applications, then employed regular expressions to locate
evidence artefacts in a memory image. MDMF [46] and Dai et al. [48] transformed the
memory dump into image directly.
• Observation 3: Among four works [45–48], only DeepMem [45] employed Phase III for
which it used an embedding method to represent a memory graph.
MDMF [46] directly fed the generated memory images into the training of a CNN model.
Dai et al. [48] used HOG feature descriptor for detecting objects, while MemTri [47]
25
extracted evidence artefacts as the input of Bayesian Network. In summary, DeepMem
belonged to class 3 shown in Figure 2, while the other three works belonged to class 1
shown in Figure 2.
• Observation 4: All the four works [45–48] have employed different classifiers even when
the types of input data are the same.
DeepMem chose fully connected network (FCN) model that has multi-layered hidden
neurons with ReLU activation functions, following by a softmax layer as the last layer.
MDMF [46] evaluated their performance both on traditional machine learning algorithms
and Deep Learning approach including CNN and LSTM. Their results showed the accu-
racy of different classifiers did not have a significant difference. MemTri employed a
Bayesian network model that is designed with three layers, i.e., a hypothesis layer, a sub-
hypothesis layer, and an evidence layer. Dai et al. used a multi-layer perception model
including an input layer, a hidden layer and an output layer as the classifier.
The above observations seem to indicate the following indications:
• Indication 1: There lacks public datasets for evaluating the performance of different
Deep Learning methods in memory forensics.
From Observation 1, we find that none of the four works surveyed was evaluated on
public datasets.
• Indication 2: From Observation 2, we find that it is disputable whether one should em-
ploy Phase II when solving memory forensics problems.
Since both [46] and [48] directly transformed a memory dump into an image, Phase II
is not required in these two works. However, since there is a large amount of useless
information in a memory dump, we argue that appropriate prepossessing could improve
the accuracy of the trained models.
• Indication 3: From Observation 3, we find that Phase III is paid not much attention in
memory forensics.
Most works did not employ Phase III. Among the four works, only DeepMem [45] em-
ployed Phase III during which it used embeddings to represent a memory graph. The
other three works [46–48] did not learn any representations before training a Deep Learn-
ing model.
• Indication 4: For Phase IV in memory forensics, different classifiers can be employed.
Which kind of classifier to use seems to be determined by the features used and their
data structures. From Observation 4, we find that the four works have actually employed
different kinds of classifiers even the types of input data are the same. It is very inter-
esting that MDMF obtained similar results with different classifiers including traditional
machine learning and Deep Learning models. However, the other three works did not
discuss why they chose a particular kind of classifier.
Since a memory dump can be considered as a sequence of bytes, the data structure of a
training data example is straightforward. If the memory dump is transformed into a simple
form in Phase II, it can be directly fed into the training process of a Deep Learning model,
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and as a result Phase III can be ignored. However, if the memory dump is transformed into a
complicated form in Phase II, Phase III could be quite useful in memory forensics.
Regarding the answer for Question 3 at Section 2.3, it is very interesting that during Phase IV
different classifiers can be employed in memory forensics. Moreover, MDMF [46] has shown
that they can obtain similar results with different kinds of classifiers. Nevertheless, they also
admit that with a larger amount of training data, the performance could be improved by Deep
Learning.
10 A closer look at applications of Deep Learning in security-
oriented fuzzing
10.1 Introduction
Fuzzing of software security is one of the state of art techniques that people use to detect
software vulnerabilities. The goal of fuzzing is to find all the vulnerabilities exist in the program
by testing as much program code as possible. Due to the nature of fuzzing, this technique works
best on finding vulnerabilities in programs that take in input files, like PDF viewers [52] or web
browsers. A typical workflow of fuzzing can be concluded as: given several seed input files,
the fuzzer will mutate or fuzz the seed inputs to get more input files, with the aim of expanding
the overall code coverage of the target program as it executes the mutated files. Although
there have already been various popular fuzzers [66], fuzzing still cannot bypass its problem of
sometimes redundantly testing input files which cannot improve the code coverage rate [50,53].
Some input files mutated by the fuzzer even cannot pass the well-formed file structure test [52].
Recent research has come up with ideas of applying Deep Learning in the process of fuzzing
to solve these problems.
In this section, we will review the very recent four representative works that use Deep
Learning for fuzzing for software security. Among the three, two representative works [50,52]
are already summarized phase-by-phase in Table 1. We direct interested readers to Table 1 for
a concise overview of those two works.
Our review will be centered around three questions described in Section 2.3. In the re-
maining of this section, we will first provide a set of observations, and then we provide the
indications. Finally, we provide some general remarks.
10.2 Key findings from a closer look
From a close look at the very recent applications using Deep Learning for solving security-
oriented program analysis challenges, we observed the followings:
• Observation 1: Deep Learning has only been applied in mutation-based fuzzing.
Even though various of different fuzzing techniques, including symbolic execution based
fuzzing [67], tainted analysis based fuzzing [68] and hybrid fuzzing [69] have been
proposed so far, we observed that all the works we surveyed employed Deep Learn-
ing method to assist the primitive fuzzing – mutation-based fuzzing. Specifically, they
adopted Deep Learning to assist fuzzing tool’s input mutation. We found that they com-
monly did it in two ways: 1) training Deep Learning models to tell how to efficiently
mutate the input to trigger more execution path [50,53]; 2) training Deep Learning mod-
els to tell how to keep the mutated files compliant with the program’s basic semantic
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requirement [52]. Besides, all three works trained different Deep Learning models for
different programs, which means that knowledge learned from one programs cannot be
applied to other programs.
• Observation 2: Similarity among all the works in our survey existed when choosing the
training samples in Phase I.
The works in this survey had a common practice, i.e., using the input files directly as
training samples of the Deep Learning model. Learn&Fuzz [52] used character-level
PDF objects sequence as training samples. Neuzz [50] regarded input files directly as
byte sequences and fed them into the neural network model. Mohit Rajpal et al. [53] also
used byte level representations of input files as training samples.
• Observation 3: Difference between all the works in our survey existed when assigning
the training labels in Phase I.
Despite the similarity of training samples researchers decide to use, there was a huge
difference in the training labels that each work chose to use. Learn&Fuzz [52] directly
used the character sequences of PDF objects as labels, same as training samples, but
shifted by one position, which is a common generative model technique already broadly
used in speech and handwriting recognition. Unlike Learn&Fuzz, Neuzz [50] and Raj-
pal’s work [53] used bitmap and heatmap respectively as training labels, with the bitmap
demonstrating the code coverage status of a certain input, and the heatmap demonstrat-
ing the efficacy of flipping one or more bytes of the input file. Whereas, as a common
terminology well-known among fuzzing researchers, bitmap was gathered directly from
the results of AFL. Heatmap used by Rajpal et al. was generated by comparing the code
coverage supported by the bitmap of one seed file and the code coverage supported by
bitmaps of the mutated seed files. It was noted that if there is acceptable level of code
coverage expansion when executing the mutated seed files, demonstrated by more “1”s,
instead of “0”s in the corresponding bitmaps, the byte level differences among the orig-
inal seed file and the mutated seed files will be highlighted. Since those bytes should be
the focus of later on mutation, heatmap was used to denote the location of those bytes.
Different labels usage in each work was actually due to the different kinds of knowledge
each work wants to learn. For a better understanding, let us note that we can simply
regard a Deep Learning model as a simulation of a “function”. Learn&Fuzz [52] wanted
to learn valid mutation of a PDF file that was compliant with the syntax and semantic
requirements of PDF objects. Their model could be seen as a simulation of f(x, θ) = y,
where x denotes sequence of characters in PDF objects and y represents a sequence
that are obtained by shifting the input sequences by one position. They generated new
PDF object character sequences given a starting prefix once the model was trained. In
Neuzz [50], an NN(Neural Network) model was used to do program smoothing, which
simultated a smooth surrogate function that approximated the discrete branching behav-
iors of the target program. f(x, θ) = y, where x denoted program’s byte level input and
y represented the corresponding edge coverage bitmap. In this way, the gradient of the
surrogate function was easily computed, due to NN’s support of efficient computation of
gradients and higher order derivatives. Gradients could then be used to guide the direc-
tion of mutation, in order to get greater code coverage. In Rajpal and others’ work [53],
they designed a model to predict good (and bad) locations to mutate in input files based
on the past mutations and corresponding code coverage information. Here, the x variable
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also denoted program’s byte level input, but the y variable represented the corresponding
heatmap.
• Observation 4: Various lengths of input files were handled in Phase II.
Deep Learning models typically accepted fixed length input, whereas the input files for
fuzzers often held different lengths. Two different approaches were used among the three
works we surveyed: splitting and padding. Learn&Fuzz [52] dealt with this mismatch
by concatenating all the PDF objects character sequences together, and then splited the
large character sequence into multiple training samples with a fixed size. Neuzz [50]
solved this problem by setting a maximize input file threshold and then, padding the
smaller-sized input files with null bytes. From additional experiments, they also found
that a modest threshold gived them the best result, and enlarging the input file size did
not grant them additional accuracy. Aside from preprocessing training samples, Neuzz
also preprocessed training labels and reduced labels dimension by merging the edges
that always appeared together into one edge, in order to prevent the multicollinearity
problem, that could prevent the model from converging to a small loss value. Rajpal
and others [53] used the similar splitting mechanism as Learn&Fuzz to split their input
files into either 64-bit or 128-bit chunks. Their chunk size was determined empirically
and was considered as a trainable parameter for their Deep Learning model, and their
approach did not require sequence concatenating at the beginning.
• Observation 5: All the works in our survey skipped Phase III.
According to our definition of Phase III, all the works in our survey did not consider
representation learning. Therefore, all the three works [50,52,53] fell into class 1 shown
in Figure 2.While as in Rajpal and others’ work, they considered the numerical represen-
tation of byte sequences. They claimed that since one byte binary data did not always
represent the magnitude but also state, representing one byte in values ranging from 0 to
255 could be suboptimal. They used lower level 8-bit representation.
The above observations seem to indicate the following indications:
• Indication 1: No alteration to the input files seems to be a correct approach.
As far as we concerned, it is due to the nature of fuzzing. That is, since every bit of
the input files matters, any slight alteration to the input files could either lose important
information or add redundant information for the neural network model to learn.
• Indication 2: Evaluation criteria should be chosen carefully when judging mutation.
Input files are always used as training samples regarding using Deep Learning technique
in fuzzing problems. Through this similar action, researchers have a common desire to
let the neural network mode learn how the mutated input files should look like. But the
criterion of judging a input file actually has two levels: on the one hand, a good input file
should be correct in syntax and semantics; on the other hand, a good input file should be
the product of a useful mutation, which triggers the program to behave differently from
previous execution path. This idea of a fuzzer that can generate semantically correct
input file could still be a bad fuzzer at triggering new execution path was first brought up
in Learn&Fuzz [52]. We could see later on works trying to solve this problem by using
either different training labels [53] or use neural network to do program smoothing [50].
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We encouraged fuzzing researchers, when using Deep Learning techniques, to keep this
problem in mind, in order to get better fuzzing results.
• Indication 3: Works in our survey only focus on local knowledge.
In brief, some of the existing works [50, 53] leveraged the Deep Learning model to
learn the relation between program’s input and its behavior and used the knowledge that
learned from history to guide future mutation. For better demonstration, we defined the
knowledge that only applied in one program as local knowledge. In other words, this
indicates that the local knowledge cannot direct fuzzing on other programs.
Based on aforementioned observations, we would like to raise several interesting questions:
1) Can the knowledge learned from the fuzzing history of one program be applied to direct
testing on other programs? 2) If the answer to question one is positive, we can suppose that
global knowledge across different programs exists? Then, can we train a model to extract the
global knowledge? 3) Whether it is possible to combine global knowledge and local knowledge
when fuzzing programs?
11 Discussion
Using high-quality data in Deep Learning is important as much as using well-structured deep
neural network architectures. That is, obtaining quality data must be an important step, which
should not be skipped, even in resolving security problems using Deep Learning. So far, this
study demonstrated how the recent security papers using Deep Learning have adopted data
conversion (Phase II) and data representation (Phase III) on different security problems. Our
observations and indications showed a clear understanding of how security experts generate
quality data when using Deep Learning.
Since we did not review all the existing security papers using Deep Learning, the generality
of observations and indications is somewhat limited. Note that our selected papers for review
have been published recently at one of prestigious security and reliability conferences such
as USENIX SECURITY, ACM CCS and so on [9]- [39], [40, 41], [45, 46], [49]- [53]. Thus,
our observations and indications help to understand how most security experts have used Deep
Learning to solve the well-known eight security problems from program analysis to fuzzing.
Our observations show that we should transfer raw data to synthetic formats of data ready
for resolving security problems using Deep Learning through data cleaning and data augmen-
tation and so on. Specifically, we observe that Phases II and III methods have mainly been used
for the following purposes:
• To clean the raw data to make the neural network (NN) models easier to interpret
• To reduce the dimensionality of data (e.g., principle component analysis (PCA), t-distributed
stochastic neighbor embedding (t-SNE))
• To scale input data (e.g., normalization)
• To make NN models understand more complex relationships depending on security prob-
lems (e.g. memory graphs)
• To simply change various raw data formats into a vector format for NN models (e.g.
one-hot encoding and word2vec embedding)
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Figure 3: Statistics of Phase II methods on eight security problems
In this following, we do further consider the question, “What if Phase II is skipped?”, not
the question, “Is Phase III always necessary?”. This is because most of the selected papers do
not consider Phase III methods (76%), or adopt with no concrete reasoning (19%). Specifically,
we demonstrate how Phase II has been adopted according to eight security problems, different
types of data, various models of NN and various outputs of NN models, in depth. Our key
findings are summarized as follows:
• How to fit security domain knowledge into raw data has not been well-studied yet.
• While raw text data are commonly parsed after embedding, raw binary data are converted
using various Phase II methods.
• Raw data are commonly converted into a vector format to fit well to a specific NN model
using various Phase II methods.
• Various Phase II methods are used according to the relationship between output of secu-
rity problem and output of NN models.
11.1 What if Phase II is skipped?
From the analysis results of our selected papers for review, we roughly classify Phase II meth-
ods into embedding2, parsing combined with embedding3, one-hot encoding4and the Others5.
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Figure 4: Statistics of Phase II methods for eight security problems
11.1.1 Findings on eight security problems
From Figure 3, we observe that most of papers over 93% use one of Phase II methods only
except for papers less than 7%, most of which belong to fuzzing. Specifically, we observe that
embedding (35%) and parsing combined with embedding (30%) are commonly used. We also
observe that papers less than 13% rarely use various Others methods. Especially, we observe
that 15% of papers use one-hot encoding because most of security data include categorical
input values, which are not directly analyzed by Deep Learning models.
From Figure 4, we also observe that according to security problems, different Phase II
methods are used. First, PA, ROP and CIF should convert raw data into a vector format using
embedding because they commonly collect instruction sequence from binary data. Second, NA
and SEAD use parsing combined with embedding because raw data such as the network traffic
and system logs consist of the complex attributes with the different formats such as categorical
and numerical input values. Third, we observe that MF uses various data structures because
memory dumps from memory layout are unstructured. Fourth, fuzzing generally uses no data
conversion since Deep Learning models are used to generate the new input data with the same
data format as the original raw data. Finally, we observe that MC commonly uses one-hot
encoding and embedding because malware binary and well-structured security log files include
categorical, numerical and unstructured data in general. These observations indicate that type
of data strongly influences on use of Phase II methods. We also observe that only MF among
eight security problems commonly transform raw data into well-structured data embedding
a specialized security domain knowledge. This observation indicates that various conversion
methods of raw data into well-structure data which embed various security domain knowledge
5The data conversion method that represents high-dimensional discrete variables into low-dimensional contin-
uous vector [70].
6The data conversion method that constitutes an input data into syntactic components in order to test conforma-
bility after embedding.
7A simple embedding where each data belonging to a specific category is mapped to a vector of 0s and a single
1. Here, the low-dimension transformed vector is not managed.
8A set of data conversion methods which generate data structures including specific specific domain knowledge
for different security problems, e.g., memory graph [45].
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Figure 5: Statistics of Phase II methods on type of data
are not yet studied in depth.
11.1.2 Findings on different data types
Note that according to types of data, a NN model works better than the others. For example,
CNN works well with images but does not work with text. From Figure 5 for raw binary data,
we observe that 51.9%, 22.3% and 11.2% of security papers use embedding, one-hot encoding
and Others, respectively. Only 14.9% of security papers, especially related to fuzzing, do not
use one of Phase II methods. This observation indicates that binary input data which have
various binary formats should be converted into an input data type which works well with a
specific NN model. From Figure 5 for raw text data, we also observe that 92.4% of papers
use parsing with embedding as the Phase II method. Note that compared with raw binary data
whose formats are unstructured, raw text data generally have the well-structured format. Raw
text data collected from network traffics may also have various types of attribute values. Thus,
raw text data are commonly parsed after embedding to reduce redundancy and dimensionality
of data.
11.1.3 Findings on various models of NN
According to types of the converted data, a specific NN model works better than the others. For
example, CNN works well with images but does not work with raw text. From Figure 6a, we
observe that use of embedding for DNN (42.9%), RNN (28.6%) and LSTM (14.3%) models
approximates to 85%. This observation indicates that embedding methods are commonly used
to generate sequential input data for DNN, RNN and LSTM models. Also, we observe that one-
hot encoded data are commonly used as input data for DNN (33.4%), CNN (33.4%) and LSTM
(16.7%) models. This observation indicates that one-hot encoding is one of common Phase II
methods to generate numerical values for image and sequential input data because many raw
input data for security problems commonly have the categorical features. We observe that
the CNN (66.7%) model uses the converted input data using the Others methods to express
the specific domain knowledge into the input data structure of NN networks. This is because
general vector formats including graph, matrix and so on can also be used as an input value of
the CNN model.
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(a) Type of NN over Phase II methods
(b) Phase II methods over type of NN
Figure 6: Statistics of Phase II methods for various types of NNs
From Figure 6b, we observe that DNN, RNN and LSTM models commonly use embed-
ding, one-hot encoding and parsing combined with embedding. For example, we observe secu-
rity papers of 54.6%, 18.2% and 18.2% models use embedding, one-hot encoding and parsing
combined with embedding, respectively. We also observe that the CNN model is used with
various Phase II methods because any vector formats such as image can generally be used as
an input data of the CNN model.
11.1.4 Findings on output of NN models
According to the relationship between output of security problem and output of NN, we may
use a specific Phase II method. For example, if output of security problem is given into a class
(e.g., normal or abnormal), output of NN should also be given into classification.
From Figure 7a, we observe that embedding is commonly used to support a security prob-
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(a) Output of NN over Phase II methods
(b) Phase II methods over output of NN
Figure 7: Statistics of Phase II methods for various output of NN
lem for classification (100%). Parsing combined with embedding is used to support a security
problem for object detection (41.7%) and classification (58.3%). One-hot encoding is used
only for classification (100%). These observations indicate that classification of a given input
data is the most common output which is obtained using Deep Learning under various Phase II
methods.
From Figure 7b, we observe that security problems, whose outputs are classification, com-
monly use embedding (43.8%) and parsing combined with embedding (21.9%) as the Phase II
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method. We also observe that security problems, whose outputs are object detection, commonly
use parsing combined with embedding (71.5%). However, security problems, whose outputs
are data generation, commonly do not use the Phase III methods. These observations indicate
that a specific Phase II method has been used according to the relationship between output of
security problem and use of NN models.
12 Further areas of investigation
Since any Deep Learning models are stochastic, each time the same Deep Learning model is fit
even on the same data, it might give different outcomes. This is because deep neural networks
use random values such as random initial weights. However, if we have all possible data for
every security problem, we may not make random predictions. Since we have the limited
sample data in practice, we need to get the best-effort prediction results using the given Deep
Learning model, which fits to the given security problem.
How can we get the best-effort prediction results of Deep Learning models for different
security problems? Let us begin to discuss about the stability of evaluation results for our se-
lected papers for review. Next, let us discuss about the influence of security domain knowledge
on prediction results of Deep Learning models.
12.1 How stable are evaluation results?
When evaluating neural network models, Deep Learning models commonly use three methods:
train-test split; train-validation-test split; and k-fold cross validation. A train-test split method
splits the data into two parts, i.e., training and test data. Even though a train-test split method
makes the stable prediction with a large amount of data, predictions vary with a small amount of
data. A train-validation-test split method splits the data into three parts, i.e., training, validation
and test data. Validation data are used to estimate predictions over the unknown data. k-fold
cross validation has k different set of predictions from k different evaluation data. Since k-fold
cross validation takes the average expected performance of the NN model over k-fold validation
data, the evaluation result is closer to the actual performance of the NN model.
From the analysis results of our selected papers for review, we observe that 40.0% and
32.5% of the selected papers are measured using a train-test split method and a train-validation-
test split method, respectively. Only 17.5% of the selected papers are measured using k-fold
cross validation. This observation implies that even though the selected papers show almost
more than 99% of accuracy or 0.99 of F1 score, most solutions using Deep Learning might not
show the same performance for the noisy data with randomness.
To get stable prediction results of Deep Learning models for different security problems,
we might reduce the influence of the randomness of data on Deep Learning models. At least, it
is recommended to consider the following methods:
• Do experiments using the same data many time: To get a stable prediction with a
small amount of sample data, we might control the randomness of data using the same
data many times.
• Use cross validation methods, e.g. k-fold cross validation: The expected average and
variance from k-fold cross validation estimates how stable the proposed model is.
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12.2 How does security domain knowledge influence the performance of
security solutions using Deep Learning?
When selecting a NN model that analyzes an application dataset, e.g., MNIST dataset [71], we
should understand that the problem is to classify a handwritten digit using a 28 × 28 black.
Also, to solve the problem with the high classification accuracy, it is important to know which
part of each handwritten digit mainly influences the outcome of the problem, i.e., a domain
knowledge.
Even while solving a security problem, knowing and using security domain knowledge for
each security problem is also important due to the following reasons. First, different domain
knowledge might generate different outcomes for each security problem using Deep Learn-
ing. That is, different data need to be collected, converted and analyzed depending on domain
knowledge of each security problem. For example, some ROP papers using Deep Learning [16]
collect program instruction sequences and then, convert them into a control-flow graph (CFG)
which helps for Deep Learning models to identify a binary branch information. On the other
hand, some NA papers using Deep Learning [21] collect Pcap files including network packet
level features and then, covert them into a vector which helps for Deep Learning models to
identify a specific attack type such as distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. That is, by
using different input data which present different security domain knowledge, NN models show
the different outcomes for each security problem.
Second, using security domain knowledge might be useful in making the size of input data
compact. While the performance of NN models improves using the large amount of data with
the high dimension, the training and evaluation (test) time also increase inefficiently. Since
domain knowledge helps to clean the raw data to make NN models easier to interpret, security
domain knowledge also helps to spend the small training and evaluation (test) time while keep-
ing the same performance. However, due to the influence of the randomness of data on Deep
Learning models, domain knowledge should be carefully adopted to avoid potential decrease
of the accuracy.
Third, security domain knowledge might be relevant to false outcomes. The performance of
Deep Learning models is commonly measured using four metrics: accuracy, precision, recall
and F-1 measure. This indicates that the number of correct predictions over the number of
predictions made is commonly important in Deep Learning. On the other hand, studies on
security problems consider two additional metrics, i.e., false negative rate and false positive
rate. This is because wrong outcomes may cause serious security breaches. Since security
domain knowledge reduces the influence of randomness of data on NN models, security domain
knowledge might be relevant to decreasing false negative rate and false positive rate.
Finally, the performance of security solutions even using Deep Learning might vary accord-
ing to datasets. When evaluating different NN models, standard datasets such as MNIST for
recognizing handwritten 10 digits and CIFAR10 [72] for recognizing 10 object classes are used
for performance comparison of different NN models. However, there is no known state-of-the-
art standard datasets for evaluating NN models on different security problems. Due to such a
limitation, we observe that most security papers using Deep Learning do not compare the per-
formance of different security solutions even when they consider the same security problem.
Thus, it is recommended to generate and use a standard dataset for a specific security problem
for comparison.
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13 Conclusion
This paper seeks to provide a dedicated review of the very recent research works on using Deep
Learning techniques to solve computer security challenges. In particular, the review covers
eight computer security problems being solved by applications of Deep Learning: security-
oriented program analysis, defending ROP attacks, achieving CFI, defending network attacks,
malware classification, system-event-based anomaly detection, memory forensics, and fuzzing
for software security. Our observations of the reviewed works indicate that the literature of
using Deep Learning techniques to solve computer security challenges is still at an earlier stage
of development.
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